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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 03-1219
                        
ROY HAYES,
      Appellant
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;
JOHN DOE, others;
JEANETTE SILVA, DR.;  JOSE DIAZ, DR.;
SOUTH JERSEY HOSPITAL SYSTEM, (BRIDGETON, NJ);
UNITES STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN H. READ, M.D.
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-01422)
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 20, 2003
Before:  RENDELL, BARRY and MAGILL*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 17, 2003)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
                                               
*Honorable Frank J. Magill, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
1 The United States of America was also a Defendant in the original action, but
Hayes is not appealing the summary judgment order granted in its favor.
2
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Roy Hayes appeals three orders of summary judgment granted by the District
Court in favor of John H. Read, M.D., Jose Diaz, M.D., and the South Jersey Hospital
System1 on Hayes’ medical malpractice and lack of informed consent claims.  We will
affirm.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We exercise
jurisdiction over the Court’s final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District
Court ruled that the claim against Dr. Read was time-barred and that there were no
genuine issues of material fact regarding the claims against Dr. Diaz and the South Jersey
Hospital System.  Hayes challenges the rulings as to all but the Hospital System.  Our
review of the District Court’s summary judgment orders is de novo.  Armour v. County of
Beaver, Pa., 271 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 2001). 
While incarcerated in a federal correctional facility, Hayes experienced difficulty
breathing and was taken to the infirmary where a catheter was inserted so that he could
urinate while restrained.  He was then transported to the South Jersey Hospital System for
examination, where he was diagnosed as suffering from urinary retention and an enlarged
prostate.  Dr. Diaz examined Hayes and removed the catheter.
Dr. Diaz’s employer, Dr. Read, then met with Hayes and, notwithstanding Hayes’s
3testimony that he had informed Dr. Read that he did not want surgery, Dr. Read scheduled
him for a cystoscopy with a possible transurethral resection (TUR).  According to Dr.
Diaz, it is the routine practice of the office that the physician who schedules a patient’s
procedures also counsels the patient about the risks and alternatives associated with them. 
Dr. Read testified that although he did not recall the specifics of his conversation with
Hayes, it is his common practice to counsel his patients about the risks and alternatives of
the TUR procedure, including its potential risk of impotence.  
Hayes signed a Consent to Procedure form on the day he met with Dr. Read. The
form gave permission to “Read/Diaz” to perform a cystoscopy and possible TUR.  Dr.
Diaz subsequently performed both procedures on Hayes.
After being released from the hospital, Hayes continued to urinate blood for
several weeks and thereafter realized that he had become impotent.  Hayes alleges that
neither Dr. Read nor Dr. Diaz discussed the TUR procedure with him and that Hayes
signed the consent form without his glasses and without receiving any explanation.
Hayes initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging medical malpractice against the prison “and
others.”  He then filed his First Amended Complaint naming, among others, the South
Jersey Hospital System, Dr. Diaz, and “John Doe” as additional Defendants.  The case
was subsequently transferred to the United States District Court of New Jersey. 
Thereafter, Hayes filed his Second Amended Complaint, alleging both medical
2 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 2000).
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malpractice and negligence based on lack of informed consent, adding “John Doe, M.D.”
as a Defendant.  
At Dr. Read’s deposition, Hayes’s counsel told him, “You’re not a party to this
action, you have not been named as a party to this action, but your name has come up as a
doctor who saw Mr. Hayes . . . and I want to ask you some questions about that.”  Joint
App. at 153.  In his deposition, Dr. Read testified that he learned about Hayes’ litigation
against Dr. Diaz shortly after Dr. Diaz was served.  Dr. Read further testified that he
discussed Hayes’ file with Dr. Diaz after learning about the litigation.
Almost a year after Dr. Read’s deposition was taken and nearly four years after
filing his original complaint, Hayes moved to amend the pleadings to join Dr. Read as a
Defendant under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  His motion was
granted and Hayes filed his Third Amended Complaint naming Dr. Read as a Defendant.  
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Read based on the
expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations2 and Hayes’ inability to satisfy
the condition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3)(B), which would have
allowed his claim against Dr. Read to “relate back” to the date of the original pleading.
When reviewing factual conclusions that a District Court has made in the context
of a Rule 15 motion, our standard of review is clear error.  Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001).  When reviewing a diversity case involving Rule
3 Hayes did not provide the original complaint to the District Court or to us. 
Therefore, like the District Court, we rely on the content of the First Amended Complaint
for purposes of our analysis.
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15, we apply federal law.  Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972). 
Under Rule 15(c)(3)(B), in order for an amended complaint to “relate back” to the
date of the original pleading, a newly named defendant must have known or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning his identity, the action would have been brought
against him in the first place.  Singletary, 266 F.3d at 194.
Dr. Read had no reason to know that, but for Hayes’s mistake, he should have been
named in the original complaint.3  For one thing, the complaint did not include a lack of
informed consent claim.  If it had, Dr. Read arguably would have had reason to know that
he should have been named as a defendant, because it was he who was responsible for
explaining the risks of the procedure to Hayes.  Moreover, as indicated in the District
Court’s opinion, Hayes never claimed that he did not have access to his medical records,
where Dr. Read’s name easily could have been obtained.  Also, there is no evidence that
Dr. Read withheld information about his identity from Hayes in order to avoid being
named as a defendant.  See id. at 201-02 n.5 (noting that fairness requires allowing a
plaintiff to add a newly named defendant where that party knew about the suit and knew
it involved him, but willfully failed to provide information about his identity to the
plaintiff).  Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not err in concluding that there
was no “relation back” and that the claims against Dr. Read are time-barred.
6We also find that the District Court’s second order, granting Dr. Diaz’s motion for
summary judgment on Hayes’ medical malpractice claim, was proper.  
In reviewing a case over which we have diversity jurisdiction, we apply the law of
the forum state.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941);
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 216 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2000).  Thus, under
New Jersey law, Hayes needed to show that Dr. Diaz deviated from accepted standards of
medical care and that the deviation proximately caused Hayes’s injuries.  Schueler v.
Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 585 (N.J. 1964); Bondi v. Pole, 587 A.2d 285, 287 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991).  Hayes also needed to show that Dr. Diaz did not exercise reasonable
judgment in caring for Hayes, and that Diaz’s judgment represented a “departure from the
requirements of accepted medical practice.”  Schueler, 204 A.2d at 585.  In order to
establish that this deviation caused Hayes’s injuries, an expert witness must attest to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability that such a causal connection existed.  Bondi,
587 A.2d at 287. 
Hayes’s sole expert witness, Dr. Kallet, testified that there were non-surgical
alternatives available which should have been attempted prior to performing the TUR. 
However, Dr. Kallet did not opine as to whether the decision to perform the TUR without
attempting any alternative was a deviation from accepted standards of medical care. 
Moreover, Dr. Kallet noted that he found nothing in his review of the case which would
have indicated negligence on the part of any physician.
4 Hayes raises a claim of battery as well as lack of informed consent, ignoring the
fact that he did not include such a claim in any of his amended complaints.  The District
Court noted this in its second order, concluding that Hayes was precluded from advancing
the battery claim.  In its third order, the District Court discussed the concept of “ghost
surgery” (where a patient consents to surgery performed by one doctor, but then another
doctor is substituted as the surgeon without the patient’s knowledge).  Although the Court
correctly determined that the theory is not applicable to this case, its discussion was
unnecessary because “ghost surgery” involves a claim of battery, not lack of informed
consent.  Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 80-81 (N.J. 2002)
(citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 439 (N.J. 1983)).
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As to causation, Dr. Kallet testified that he did not have an opinion to a reasonable
degree of medical probability that the TUR caused or contributed to Hayes’ impotence. 
Furthermore, Dr. Malloy, an expert for the defense, testified that the “TUR would have
had a very small chance of causing any problems,” and indicated that other factors were
more likely to have contributed to Hayes’s sexual dysfunction.  Joint App. at 246.
Accordingly, Hayes failed to provide evidence that the TUR procedure was the
cause of the impotence, and we will affirm the District Court’s ruling on this issue. 
Finally, we will not disturb the District Court’s third order granting summary
judgment to Dr. Diaz based on Hayes’ lack of informed consent claim.4  In order to
survive summary judgment on this issue, Hayes first needed to provide evidence that Dr.
Diaz withheld pertinent medical information about the risks of the TUR procedure, its
alternatives, or the possible results if the procedure were not performed.  Howard, 800
A.2d at 79.  Second, he needed to show that there was a causal link between the lack of
disclosure and the injury itself.  Id.  Third, Hayes was required to demonstrate that a
8reasonably prudent patient in his position would have declined to undergo the treatment if
he had been informed of its risks.  Id.  Finally, Hayes needed to show that “‘the
undisclosed risk occurred and harmed [him],’” and that the “‘surgical procedure was a
proximate cause of [his] injuries.’”  Id.  (citation omitted).
As stated above, the lack of informed consent claim against Dr. Read is time-
barred.  Thus, we focus our inquiry, as the District Court did, on whether Dr. Diaz had a
separate duty to inform Hayes.
Dr. Diaz testified that the routine practice of the office is that the physician who
schedules a patient’s procedure also counsels the patient about its risks before obtaining
his consent.  Thus, Dr. Diaz neither counseled Hayes nor obtained his consent because he
knew that Dr. Read would do so.  Prior to operating on Hayes, Dr. Diaz reviewed his
medical file to be sure that Hayes signed the consent form, which gave both Dr. Diaz and
Dr. Read permission to perform the TUR.  Hayes has not presented us with, nor have we
found, any authority indicating that Dr. Diaz had a separate duty to again disclose to
Hayes all of the risks involved in the procedure or to re-obtain his consent.
Additionally, we note that even if Hayes were able to successfully argue that Dr.
Diaz had such a duty, he could not survive a summary judgment motion on this issue
because he failed to provide evidence that the TUR procedure proximately caused his
impotence.  Therefore, the District Court’s summary judgment order on this third issue
was appropriate.
9Because the District Court correctly granted the motions for summary judgment
against Hayes, we will affirm.
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TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/  Marjorie O. Rendell   
Circuit Judge
